The Fleet Washington Could Not Lose

Quick answer: Why did Washington need the French fleet at Yorktown? Washington's siege of Yorktown depended on Admiral de Grasse's French fleet holding the Chesapeake Bay, which kept the Royal Navy from rescuing Cornwallis and protected the small vessels carrying food to the allied army. De Grasse answered to the king of France, so when he proposed sailing out to fight, Washington had to persuade him to stay. Twenty-four days before the British surrender at Yorktown, George Washington warned in a letter of September 25, 1781, that his army might have to disband for want of provisions if the French fleet left the Chesapeake Bay. The naval battle that made the siege possible had already been fought without a single American warship, and the admiral commanding those ships, François Joseph Paul de Grasse, answered to Louis XVI and had a war of his own to fight in the Caribbean. John and Mitch Yockelson heard the wider story this month at the French Embassy, where retired Major General Vincent de Kytspotter spoke about France's war for American independence. In July, at Cap-Français, the Spanish royal commissioner Francisco Saavedra agreed that the planned invasion of Jamaica would wait, offered Spanish protection for French merchant ships, and helped raise an emergency loan in Havana, which freed de Grasse to sail north with twenty-eight ships of the line and money for the campaign. On September 5, at Chester, Pennsylvania, Washington learned the fleet had arrived and was seen on shore waving his hat and a white handkerchief. That same day de Grasse fought the British off the Chesapeake, and after several days of maneuvering the French held the entrance to the bay. On September 23 de Grasse proposed taking his ships out to meet British reinforcements in open water, writing that he could not sacrifice the fleet he commanded. Washington could not order him to stay. He answered that with French naval protection the siege was "reducible to calculation," explained how much his supplies depended on small vessels moving along Virginia's rivers, and sent Lafayette to make the case in person. De Grasse kept his fleet in the Chesapeake. Allied batteries opened fire on October 9, Alexander Hamilton's Americans and a French force took Redoubts 10 and 9 on the night of October 14, a storm broke up Cornwallis's attempt to move his army across the York River, and the British surrendered on October 19. The relief expedition from New York sailed that same day and reached the Chesapeake five days later. When the news reached Lord North, he paced his office exclaiming, "Oh God, it is all over," and his government fell within months. De Grasse went back to the Caribbean, where a British fleet defeated him at the Battle of the Saintes on April 12, 1782, captured Ville de Paris, and took him prisoner. John closes by noting that it was Rochambeau who argued for striking Cornwallis in Virginia instead of assaulting New York, and that generations passed before Americans learned how much of the Yorktown campaign was French in its conception. Why it matters for leaders: Washington held the top American command and still could not give the order that mattered most at Yorktown. The fleet belonged to an ally with its own war, and its admiral had sound reasons to sail. Washington kept it by spelling out in concrete terms what the bay meant to his supply lines and by sending Lafayette to talk with de Grasse face to face. A leader who depends on partners outside the chain of command has to make the stakes clear enough that the partner decides to stay. Q: Why couldn't Washington simply order the French fleet to stay at Yorktown? A: Admiral de Grasse answered to Louis XVI and had obligations in the Caribbean, including a postponed invasion of Jamaica. He had already warned Washington that his time in Virginia was limited and would not commit beyond November 1, so Washington had to persuade him that protecting the siege justified the risk to his fleet. Q: What happened to Admiral de Grasse after Yorktown? A: De Grasse returned to the Caribbean, where French plans again included an invasion of Jamaica. On April 12, 1782, a British fleet defeated him at the Battle of the Saintes, captured his flagship Ville de Paris, and took him prisoner. In Britain he was used to carry messages of peace between Britain and France. Read the full essay on Substack → https://heroespath.substack.com/p/the-fleet-washington-could-not-lose By John Fenzel, founder and CEO of Heroes' Path Foundation